La cualificación del Comité de Auditoría en las empresas europeasantecedentes e implicaciones

  1. Félix J. López Iturriaga 1
  2. Nuria Reguera Alvarado 2
  3. César Zarza Herranz 3
  1. 1 Universidad de Valladolid
    info

    Universidad de Valladolid

    Valladolid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01fvbaw18

  2. 2 Universidad de Sevilla
    info

    Universidad de Sevilla

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03yxnpp24

  3. 3 Universidad de Alcalá
    info

    Universidad de Alcalá

    Alcalá de Henares, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04pmn0e78

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Revista:
Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación. CEF

ISSN: 2695-6896,  2792-8306

Año de publicación: 2017

Número: 413-414

Páginas: 127-166

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación. CEF

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet