La persona adecuada en el momento adecuado:los miembros del comité de auditoría y la calidad de la información financiera

  1. Félix López Iturriaga
  2. Nuria Reguera Alvarado
  3. César Zarza Herranz
Revista:
Universia Business Review

ISSN: 1698-5117

Año de publicación: 2018

Número: 58

Páginas: 18-35

Tipo: Artículo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Universia Business Review

Resumen

We analyze some personal characteristics of the members of the audit committee of the Spanish listed firms and the relation between these characteristics and earnings management. We find a non-linear relation with tenure, so that long tenures can initially compromise the directors’ independence but, after a given threshold, longer tenures improve the expertise of the members. Serving in too many boards has a negative influence on the ability of directors to detect earnings management, and higher academic background and more diverse professional background improve the directors’ abilities

Referencias bibliográficas

  • Andres, C., van den Bongard, I., & Lehmann, M. (2013). Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 40(9-10), 1221-1246. doi: 10.1111/jbfa.12051
  • Baccouche, S., Hadriche, M., & Omri, A. (2013). The Impact Of Audit Committee Multiple-Directorships On Earnings Management: Evidence From France. Journal of Applied Business Research, 29(5), 1333-1342.
  • Badolato, P. G., Donelson, D. C., & Ege, M. (2014). Audit committee financial expertise and earnings management: The role of status. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 58(2–3), 208-230. doi: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.08.006
  • Ben-Amar, W., Francoeur, C., Hafsi, T., & Labelle, R. (2013). What Makes Better Boards? A Closer Look at Diversity and Ownership. British Journal of Management, 24(1), 85-101. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8551.2011.00789.x
  • CNMV. (2015). Good Governance Code of Listed Companies. Madrid.
  • CNMV. (2017). Technical guide on audit committees at public-interest entities Madrid.
  • Dhaliwal, D., Naiker, V., & Navissi, F. (2010). The association between accruals quality and the characteristics of accounting experts and mix of expertise on audit committees. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(3), 787-827. doi: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01027.x
  • European Banking Authority, & European Securities and Markets Authority. (2017). Joint ESMA and EBA Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders under Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU. Paris. London.
  • European Central Bank. (2017). Guide to fit and proper assessments. Frankfurt.
  • European Commission. (2011). Green paper on the EU corporate governance framework. Brussels: European Commission.
  • Habbash, M., Sindezingue, C., & Salama, A. (2013). The effect of audit committee characteristics on earnings management: Evidence from the United Kingdom. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 10(1), 13-38. doi: 10.1057/jdg.2012.2
  • Jaafar, M. A., Wan-Hussin, W. N., & Bamahros, H. M. (2016). Are All Audit Committee Directors Equal? The Busyness of Chair, Financial Expert and Other Member. Information, 19(7B), 2893.
  • Kusnadi, Y., Leong, K. S., Suwardy, T., & Wang, J. (2016). Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality in Singapore. [journal article]. Journal of Business Ethics, 139(1), 197-214. doi: 10.1007/s10551-015-2679-0
  • Lee, G., & Fargher, N. L. (2017). The Role of the Audit Committee in their Oversight of Whistle-Blowing. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Forthcoming. doi: 10.2308/ajpt-51769
  • Monterrey, J., & Sánchez, A. (2008). Gobierno corporativo, conflictos de agencia y elección de auditor. Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, 37(137), 113-156.
  • Palazuelos Cobo, E., Herrero Crespo, Á., & Montoya del Corte, J. (2017). Are credit risk analysts concerned about the audit of the financial statements of SMEs?/¿Importa la auditoría de los estados financieros de las Pymes a los analistas de riesgo de crédito? Universia Business Review, 53, 150-187.
  • Parte Esteban, L., & Gonzalo Angulo, J. A. (2008). ¿Añaden las partidas extraordinarias calidad al resultado? Universia Business Review, 18, 28-39.
  • Parte Esteban, L., & Gonzalo Angulo, J. A. (2009). ¿Se maquillan los resultados de las cotizadas en España? Universia Business Review, 21, 36-55.
  • Ruiz Barbadillo, E., Gómez Aguilar, N., & Carrera Pena, N. (2009a). Derogación de la rotación obligatoria de auditores y calidad de la auditoría. Revista de Economía Aplicada, 49(17), 105-134.
  • Ruiz Barbadillo, E., Gómez Aguilar, N., & Carrera Pena, N. (2009b). Does Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Enhance Auditor Independence? Evidence from Spain. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 28(1), 113-135. doi: 10.2308/aud.2009.28.1.113
  • Sharma, V. D., & Kuang, C. (2014). Voluntary Audit Committee Characteristics, Incentives, and Aggressive Earnings Management: Evidence from New Zealand. International Journal of Auditing, 18(1), 76-89. doi: 10.1111/ijau.12013
  • Sultana, N., & Mitchell Van der Zahn, J. L. W. (2015). Earnings conservatism and audit committee financial expertise. Accounting & Finance, 55(1), 279-310. doi: 10.1111/acfi.12042
  • Tanyi, P. N., & Smith, D. B. (2015). Busyness, Expertise, and Financial Reporting Quality of Audit Committee Chairs and Financial Experts. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 34(2), 59-89. doi: 10.2308/ajpt-50929
  • Tepalagul, N., & Lin, L. (2015). Auditor independence and audit quality: A literature review. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 30(1), 101-121.
  • Vafeas, N. (2003). Length of Board Tenure and Outside Director Independence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 30(7-8), 1043-1064. doi: 10.1111/1468-5957.05525
  • Wang, M.-J., Su, X.-Q., Wang, H.-D., & Chen, Y.-S. (2017). Directors’ education and corporate liquidity: evidence from boards in Taiwan. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 49(2), 463-485.
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet