Say on pay effectiveness, corporate governance mechanisms, and CEO compensation alignment

  1. Gregorio Sánchez-Marín 1
  2. Gabriel Lozano-Reina 1
  3. J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler 1
  4. María Encarnación Lucas-Pérez 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Murcia
    info

    Universidad de Murcia

    Murcia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03p3aeb86

Revista:
Business Research Quarterly

ISSN: 2340-9444,  2340-9436

Año de publicación: 2017

Volumen: 20

Número: 4

Páginas: 226-239

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.BRQ.2017.07.001 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Business Research Quarterly

Resumen

Say on pay (SOP) es un mecanismo de gobierno relativamente nuevo que permite a los accionistas pronunciarse sobre la idoneidad de la compensación de los ejecutivos. La literatura ha examinado principalmente los efectos de los SOP en contextos anglosajones de gobierno corporativo, reportando resultados mixtos y destacando la necesidad de profundizar nuestra comprensión de su impacto real, así como sus interacciones con otros mecanismos de gobierno. Respecto a estas brechas, la presente investigación analiza la efectividad de los SOP como mecanismo de alineación de la compensación de los CEO en el contexto de las sociedades cotizadas españolas, un buen modelo representativo de los sistemas de gobierno corporativo de Europa continental. También examina el efecto moderador del control de la junta y la estructura de propiedad. Utilizando datos de panel y metodologías de regresión lineal en un conjunto de empresas de 2013 a 2016,

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Información de financiación

Financial support from the Research Program of Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of Spain (Project ECO2014-54301-P) and Fundación Cajamurcia is acknowledged.

Financiadores

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