Influencia del say-on-pay como mecanismo de gobierno corporativo en las empresas cotizadas españolas

  1. Gabriel Lozano-Reina 1
  2. Gregorio Sánchez-Marín 1
  3. J. Samuel Baixauli Soler 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Murcia
    info

    Universidad de Murcia

    Murcia, España

    ROR https://ror.org/03p3aeb86

Revista:
UCJC Business & Society Review

ISSN: 2659-3270

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 16

Número: 4

Páginas: 68-131

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: UCJC Business & Society Review

Resumen

El Say-on-Pay (SOP) es un mecanismo de gobierno corporativo mediante el que los ac-cionistas pueden votar sobre la idoneidad de las retribuciones de los altos directivos de las empresas cotizadas. Usando una muestra de una muestra de 113 empresas españolas en el periodo 2011-2018, este trabajo analiza los efectos potenciales del SOP en las retribuciones de los altos directivos a la luz de las diferentes tipologías que existen de esta votación para, a continuación, examinar empíricamente cómo las retribuciones de los CEOs de las empresas cotizadas españolas se han visto afectadas desde la implementación del SOP

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Información de financiación

Este trabajo ha sido realizado con el apoyo del Minsiterio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (Proyectos ECO2014-54301-P y ECO2017-84209-P), de la Universidad de Murcia (bajo el programa FPU), y de la Fundación CajaMurcia.

Financiadores

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