"Earnings Benchmarks" en las empresas hoteleras internacionalizadas

  1. Parte Esteban, Laura 1
  2. Such-Devesa, María J. 2
  1. 1 Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
    info

    Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02msb5n36

  2. 2 Universidad de Alcalá
    info

    Universidad de Alcalá

    Alcalá de Henares, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04pmn0e78

Revista:
Management Letters / Cuadernos de Gestión

ISSN: 1131-6837

Any de publicació: 2011

Volum: 11

Número: 2

Pàgines: 15-36

Tipus: Article

DOI: 10.5295/CDG.090191LP DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openADDI editor

Altres publicacions en: Management Letters / Cuadernos de Gestión

Resum

This paper focuses on earnings management around earnings benchmarks (avoiding losses and earnings decreases hypothesis) in international firms and non international firms belonging to the Spanish hotel industry. First, frequency histograms are used to determine the existence of a discontinuity in earnings in both segments. Second, the use of discretionary accruals as a tool to meet earnings benchmarks is analysed in international and non international firms. Empirical evidence shows that international and non international firms meet earnings benchmarks. It is also noted different behaviour between international and non international firms.

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