Campaña de Austerlitzantecedentes económicos, desarrollo de las operaciones y consecuencias para Europa
- Pontijas Calderón, José Luis
- Miguel Alonso Baquer Director/a
- Miguel Ángel Díaz Mier Codirector/a
Universitat de defensa: Universidad de Alcalá
Fecha de defensa: 21 de de juny de 2010
- José Morilla Critz President/a
- Luis Felipe Rivera Galicia Secretari
- María Antonia Calvo Hornero Vocal
- Antonio María Ávila Álvarez Vocal
- Antonio Ortiz-Arce de la Fuente Vocal
Tipus: Tesi
Resum
As a final step of my doctorate studies I decided to carry out a thorough study on Austerlitz campaign adding new points of view by integrating the political, economic, strategic, organisational, psychological and military (including operational and tactical) perspectives. The aim is to provide a holistic understanding of the different vectors that guided the events chain of the campaign paying an especial attention to economic factors. For that purpose the work is divided in eight chapters. First chapter is an introduction where the reasons for the study are explained digging in the state of the subject, the instruments used during the sources investigation, the aim of the study as whole and a scheme of the work. It is provide too a list of the hypothesis that should be demonstrated all along the study. Second chapter is dedicated to describe the international situation during the beginning of the XIXth century with a small introduction elaborating a little bit on the international relations during that time, followed by a general narration of the political situation of the different powers involved in the conflict (Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia), preceded by a description of how events leaded to the confrontation. In chapter three we study the economic framework of the Napoleonic France, giving a clear picture no only on the economy in general but focusing on fiscal system, taxation and the Imperial budget, with a thorough study on the different annual budgets and the modifications and manipulations carried out by Napoleon to hide the sterling situation of the French finances due to the pressure and attrition that war effort put on it along the Napoleonic wars. As a result we could affirm that two main effects were produced. First, the Imperial budget was never enough to match war needs, and that need provoked a general depredation over vassal states and allied nations economies, as well as over the French country. On the other hand, due to the Franco-British Blockade the annihilation of the French Atlantic maritime commerce stirred up a displacement of the French economic activity to the north and east, to the banks of the Rhine. That zone attracted a high proportion of the continental commerce so becoming a wealthy zone that provided capital to fuel the taking of industry at the beginning of Industrial Revolution. For then to the final of the Second World War, those rich lands were the objet of different wars between France and Prussia/Germany to control them. Chapter fourth studies the organisation and ideology of the Napoleonic Empire describing the Revolution heritage, administrative mechanisms and model emphasizing the role played by top generals and prefects. The most importance consequence of this part is the centralized organisation of the Empire that provided a sole head taking decisions and so ensuring that every effort was pointed to the critical goals at the critical times. Another important consequence of this chapter is the doctrine that galvanized most of the French people, soldiers included, that gave them the idea of spreading a new era of freedom to the rest of European countries. On the other hand the system designed by Napoleon himself was specifically created to get to the top of the military and civilian structures the ablest a most capable men. Honours, glory, military promotion, social position and wealthy (and by wealthy we mean pure many) provided in good quantity for those who dared to risque their lives in combat with great success, gave a “sprit de corps” to the Napoleonic forces with no comparison to other armies of the time who were hampered by the hieratical ideas coming from the Age of Enlightenment. In the following chapter we analyzed the military doctrine of the time focussing on Bonaparte’s masters, those who elaborated military doctrines that young Bonaparte joined in a comprehensive way of making war by studying the most outstanding and modern military theories and famous commanders and campaigns of the history so far. Once studied those military theories and theorists we are in a good position to analyzed the operational and tactical way of Napoleon’s waiving war. This study includes the army corps and division units, which were a unique type of tactical military organization at the time providing great flexibility to Napoleonic armies in the field of battle. The chapter finalize with an approach to the physical circumstances and psychological factors of the combat tactics digging in those affecting the combatants and the psychological bases for the tactic procedures taking into account infantry and cavalry during the offensive and the defensive actions, the way of delivering fire, and finalizing with some important conclusions. Those conclusions are crucial to understand the evolution of events during the campaign and battle. Chapter sixth studied in depth the armies of the different powers in conflict, although the British and Prussian ones are slightly described due to their indirect participation in the Austerlitz campaign. It is shown the organisation from regiment down to company or squadron level and the different tactics employed by the armies having some impact on the combat tactic results. The most important conclusion is that although every army of the time knew the new military theories only napoleonic armies were able to apply them in the field of battle thanks to the French army’s renovation due to the purges suffered by the officers’ ensemble during the Revolution. The following chapter submerges us into the campaign. We see the previously studied armies acting, manoeuvring and fighting. We also see the consequences provoked by the invasion of the Prussian territory of Ansbach that change the strategic situation against Napoleon. Although Austrian senior commander acts in a clumsy way, most of the Austrian and Russian officers and units demonstrate their outstanding capabilities, very far from the assumed role for them, specially by the Anglo-Saxon historians. Some Russian suffered so much attrition that their performance during the battle will be poor. The way in which international relations is carried out played an important role during the campaign that keep Prussia idling just waiting for an appropriate opportunity. One of the final and most important conclusions of this chapter is how was impossible for Napoleon to foresee with anticipation the place where the battle took place. The final act of the epopee is the battle itself. During the fight we see the units accomplishing an allied plan designed by a typical Austrian staff officer that led allied army to a disaster. We see too how the initial Napoleon’s plan for the battle was completely different from the course of action finally carried out. That shows Napoleon’s ability to distinguish a good opportunity in the battle chaos and to seize it completely changing the plan if necessary without hesitation. We demonstrate that the so called “terrible finale” (thousands of allied troops drawn in the cold water of lake Satchand) was inexistent and we argue over the contradictory numbers about casualties. The chapter finalised by analysing the factors for a so decisive victory. Last chapter is a summary of the work conclusions in which we sum up the hypothesis demonstrations obtained all along the different chapters. The work ends with some annexes providing information that completes the picture, like the revolutionary calendar, Austrian, Russian and French commander biographies and armies organisation and composition in the day of battle. It is also provided a copy of the document “Dispositions générales pour la journée du 11” master piece to prove that Napoleon had different plan for the battle.