Urbanizar las pasionesla simpatía humeana y el afinamiento moral

  1. Julio Seoane Pinilla 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Alcalá
    info

    Universidad de Alcalá

    Alcalá de Henares, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04pmn0e78

Revue:
Araucaria: Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales

ISSN: 2340-2199 1575-6823

Année de publication: 2018

Titre de la publication: Monográfico I: HUME. Monográfico II: La Integración Inter-Regional Euro Latino Americana a través de los Derechos Humanos

Volumen: 20

Número: 40

Pages: 311-332

Type: Article

DOI: 10.12795/ARAUCARIA.2018.I40.14 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

D'autres publications dans: Araucaria: Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales

Objectifs de Développement Durable

Résumé

In this work I try to show the way in which Hume’s sympathy (a) changes the baroque passions into moral sentiments. In this way (b) interest can be established as something admissible in a virtuous behavior. This supposes the admission that there is no morality out of a social context where such sentiments are refined in a reflective way –although not only rational– following the same model used to refine the sense of taste.

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