Retribución de la alta dirección, etructura del consejo administrativo y resultados

Abstract

Previous empirical results reveal various contradictions when relating top management compensation, board structure and levels of performance. While fewer directors and more external directors is associated with better supervision, there is no agreement on the effect on top management compensation level. This lack of consensus is even more noticeable when analysing the effect performance. This paper offers a theoretical framework and a panel data methodology based empirical study to account for how earlier analyses have differed. Given the great board dimension in the Spanish market, information processing perspectives are confirmed which link positively board size with higher top management compensation. Similarly, a higher proportion of external directors reduces top management compensation level since it improves supervision and reduces insiders� power. Finally, a quadratic relation is obtained between performance and top management compensation. This relation explains both a positive effect, supported by agency theory on performance at low levels of management compensation, and a negative effect as a consequence of higher managers� discretion at high levels.