Análisis de las características de los trabajadores participantes en las medidas de reparto del empleo en España

  1. Carlos García-Serrano 1
  2. José María Arranz 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Alcalá
    info

    Universidad de Alcalá

    Alcalá de Henares, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04pmn0e78

Revue:
Revista del Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social

ISSN: 2660-4647

Année de publication: 2020

Titre de la publication: Economía y Sociología

Número: 146

Pages: 147-181

Type: Article

D'autres publications dans: Revista del Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social

Résumé

This article examines three issues: (a) what are the characteristics of companies, jobs and workers involved in short-time work (STW) measures in Spain; (b) what is the duration of recipiency and the degree of repetition of unemployment benefits for suspension of contract and reduction of hours; and (c) what are the characteristics of the workers affected by these measures who, being subsequently dismissed, are entitled to the replenishment of the duration of the unemployment insurance benefit. The information used comes from the microdata of the unemployment benefit files of the Public Employment Service (PES), available for 2007-2015. The period of analysis has been limited to the years in which the use of the Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo (EREs) of suspension of contract and reduction of hours increased considerably as a result of the last economic recession, with two years as reference: one of very intense use as was 2009 and another of much smaller use as 2015. In relation to the characteristics of the recipients of benefits associated with STW, they were in 2009 mostly male, 30-44 years old, employed in industry companies and in lowskilled manual jobs. These features have changed somewhat in 2015, with the majority becoming the over-45s. Comparison of the distribution of these recipients with that of the total contributory unemployment benefit recipients has allowed to analyze in which sociodemographic and labor characteristics those are over– or under-represented. The results are that males, aged 45 or over, working in low-skilled manual jobs («elementary occupations») and in industrial firms are over-represented in the perception of benefits associated with STW. These are therefore workers (and jobs) for which the protection of employment and unemployment is high. This coincides with studies conducted for other countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, where the use of STW is usually higher than in Spain. As regards the duration and repetition in the collection of unemployment benefits associated with work-sharing measures, PES microdata has also been used, but the information has had to be intensively processed to be converted into longitudinal information, that is, referring to the same individuals over time. This has made it possible to calculate the cumulative effective duration of the recipients of insurance benefits, which is particularly relevant in the case of benefits associated with STW, since suspension days or hours of reduction of hours does not have to be in a row. The results show that recipients of benefits due to suspension of contracts have relatively short cumulative durations (just under five months – about 135 days – in 2007-2008, less than three months – 86 days – in 2009 and about four months – between 104 and 128 days – in 2010-2013), while those for reduction of hours were longer (seven months – around 210 days – in 2007 and 2009, with a peak of almost nine months – 268 days in 2008 – and four-five months – between 126 and 151 days – in 2010-2013). As these figures are based on information on days and not on hours, this results in an over-estimation of the number of days of perception. As regards repetition in perception, which is implicit in the same nature as unemployment benefits associated with STW, what has been obtained from the PES data is that the average individual has gone from repeating two times in suspension benefits if he/she first entered the perception in 2007 to doing so 14 times if he entered it in 2013 (with shorter durations), while workers receiving reduction benefits have averaged 2.3 times in 2007 to almost 4 times in 2013. The sum of the durations of all these repetition episodes is what produces the accumulated effective durations mentioned above. Finally, the examination of the characteristics of the workers affected by the worksharing measures who were dismissed and then entitled to the replenishment of the duration of the insurance unemployment benefit (in accordance with the provisions of RDL 2/2009 of 6 March) shows that those are similar to the average of those affected by EREs of suspension or reduction. In this sense, it highlights the importance of those who worked in low-skilled positions («elementary occupations») and in industry, whose weights are particularly high in the early years of the recessive period (2009 and 2010). In addition, these are recipients that are located at the top of the distribution of potential durations, the majority group being that of the recipients who start an insurance benefit with an entitlement period of 720 days (the maximum possible). This indicates that workers involved in work-sharing measures are mainly workers with long seniority, with a lot of work experience and with the right to long periods of unemployment protection. Despite this, the average effective durations of these workers were less than the potential durations, because less than half of these exhausted the potential period of recipiency.

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